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INTRODUCTION
Corporate Governance (CG) creates and sustains monitoring frameworks which guide the managerial actions such that the agents are motivated to enhance the well-being of the various stakeholders of the firm (Clarke, 1998; Cooper and Owen, 2007) . The literature has extensively described the positive effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of firms. For instance, firms with better CG mechanisms report superior profitability (Balasubramanian et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2013; Ararat et al., 2017) have access to cheaper source of funds (Anderson et al., 2004; Ghouma et al., 2018) produce higher firm value (Klein et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2011; Nini et al., 2012) have better market liquidity (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) better linkages with the credit market (Funchal and Monte-Mor, 2016 ) sound financing mix (Jiraporn et al., 2012) and higher dividend payout (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Harford et al., 2008) . Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that the board is the central decision making authority in the organization.
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The previous studies indicate that the boards improve the quality of the discussion thereby enhancing the quality of the decision making process, such that it results in the safeguarding of the shareholder interests by the firm (John and Senbet, 1998; Finegold et al., 2007; Garcia-Torea et al., 2016) .
The development of a sound and market oriented banking and financial system is imperative for developing economies and banks" financial performance is an important determinant of the growth rate of the emerging economies (Acharya et al., 2017) . A number of studies have related the board characteristics with the performance of banks in developed economies (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Pathan et al., 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Belkhir, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Pathan, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2010; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Bertay et al., 2013; Nyamongo and Temesgen, 2013; Berger et al., 2014) . Interestingly, few researchers argue that there is no relationship between board parameters and bank performance (Laeven, 2013; Alemu and Negasa, 2015; John et al., 2016) . To the best of the knowledge of the authors, no research work has been carried out with an objective of assessing the influence of board characteristics on the performance of the banks operating in India.
This paper seeks to address the following research questions: 1) Is there a relationship between board characteristics and the market performance of Indian banks?
2) Which are the board characteristics that determine the market performance of Indian banks?
The paper has the following objectives. 1) To explore the relationship between board characteristics and the market performance of the Indian banks (measured through Tobin"s Q).
2) To empirically investigate the impact of board characteristics on the market performance of the Indian banks (proxied by Tobin"s Q).
This study is based on data related to board characteristics and market performance of twenty-nine listed banks. Data on board characteristics were collected from the annual reports of the sample banks. Data on market performance (Tobin"s Q) and control variables (bank age and bank size) was collected from CMIE Prowess, the database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy. Findings suggest that the board characteristics of Indian banks have a positive and significant impact on their market performance. The uniqueness of the paper is that it introduces a new measure of corporate governance which is constructed using the board characteristics of the sample banks that were collected from their annual reports.
The findings of the article have major implications: 1) Firstly, banks can improve their market performance (market prices) by improving their board composition such that their market values are maximized.
2) Secondly, researchers can get more insights on the influence of board characteristics on the market performance of banks by extending the scope of the study.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: the second section deals with the literature review and the development of the theoretical framework. The third section presents the methodology conveying information about the sample selection, variables used, and the model specification. Analysis and discussion of the results are presented in the fourth section. Final section concludes the study and spells out the direction for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate governance impacts investment, capital structure choices (Detthamrong et al., 2017) as well as dividend pay-out decisions (Setiawan and Phua, 2013) . Extant research suggests that effective CG practices enhance the organizational performance (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Andreou et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2017; Pillai and Almalkawi, 2018) . Board related parameters are assumed to be a proxy for corporate governance of firms (Boone et al., 2007; Andres and Vallelado, 2008) . The board of the firm has the obligation of monitoring its performance on behalf of the shareholders (Acharya et al., 2011) . It is the duty of the board of directors to advise the executive managers on a regular basis though in practice it is neglected by the board members (Barroso et al., 2011) . Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009) report that board characteristics have a positive effect on the growth of firms. Conger and Lawler, (2008) indicate that board characteristics contribute to a higher firm value for the largest U.K. firms. Abidin et al. (2014) in their study based on a sample of 75 randomly chosen firms listed in Bursa Malaysia, argue that board characteristics have a positive impact on the performance of firms. Chaghadari and Chaleshtori (2011) based on a sample of 30 listed Malaysian companies, contend that board characteristics have a mixed effect on firm performance.
According to the "modern theory of financial intermediation", liquidity creation is an essential role of banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Fungáčová et al., 2017) . In emerging economies, financial markets tend to be less developed, hence banks play a predominant role in providing access to capital markets (Ogura, 2018) . Banks play a major role in providing access to credit to various forms of economic entities in countries with underdeveloped capital markets (Sufian and Chong, 2008) . What differentiates banks from other financial entities is that, banks mobilize a major portion of its funds through liabilities that are largely in the form of deposits and their assets mainly comprise of loans with different maturity periods (Macey and O'Hara, 2003) . It is critical to understand, whether performance of banks is shaped by governance at bank level, country level, or both (Betratti, 2009 ).
Literature suggests that informational asymmetries are larger with banks (Borio et al., 2001 ). The literature consists of studies with mixed results on the association between corporate governance and bank performance. A number of authors, have revealed the positive association between board parameters and performance of banks (Crawford et al., 1995; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Belkhir, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012) . On the contrary, some studies report the existence of a negative relationship between board characteristics and performance of banks (Ferreira et al., 2010; Mehran et al., 2011; Westman, 2011; Nyamongo and Temesgen, 2013) .
However, some researchers have concluded that these two variables are not at all related (Laeven, 2013; Nyamongo and Temesgen, 2013; Alemu and Negasa, 2015; John et al., 2016) . Williams and Nguyen (2005) In developed countries, the efficiency of the banks which is "a quick and convenient way of bank"s ability to turn resources into revenue" is known to portray the quality of financial development (Koetter and Wedow, 2010; Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013) . Relatively, fewer studies look at the relationship between board characteristics and bank performance, also those studies focus primarily on the impact of board characteristics on the performance and efficiency scores of banks (Tecles and Tabak, 2010 ).
An understanding of board characteristics of banks is imperative especially in light of the prominent role that banks play in emerging economies, and the nature of the banking reforms that these economies have implemented (Deb, 2013) . Therefore, the research questions that come to the fore are: (i) Is there a relationship between board characteristics and the market performance of Indian banks?
(ii)Which are the board characteristics that determine the market performance of Indian banks?
This work introduces a new measure of CG, which attempts to measure corporate governance using data collected on board characteristics from the annual reports of Indian banks. The previous studies have used the data on board characteristics that are reported by secondary databases such as CMIE Prowess and Bloomberg.
Therefore, this work aims to understand the impact of board characteristics on the market performance of Indian banks through the theoretical framework which is presented in figure I The data on board characteristics of sample banks were collected from the annual reports of banks. The data on the market performance and control variables for the study were collected from CMIE Prowess, the database of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) . The CMIE database is a credible source of information (Mishra and Mohanty, 2014; Haldar and Rao, 2015; Arora and Sharma, 2016; Saravanan et al., 2017) . It provides data on financial statements such as balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statements for the listed firms in India.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable related to market performance used by this study and its measurement are presented below.
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Tobin"s Q is the ratio of market value of a company to its replacement costs. As it is arduous to estimate the replacement cost, we consider the book value of banks as a proxy for their replacement costs. This measure is useful for understanding the cross sectional differences in banks (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) .
Independent Variables
In order to understand the influence of board characteristics on the market performance on Indian banks, the following ten independent variables were identified. 1) Proportion of non-executive directors: It is defined as the ratio of the strength of the non-executive directors to the total number of board members (Armstrong et al., 2014) .
2) Number of board members: It is the strength of the board of directors of banks (Johl et al., 2015) .
3) CEO Duality: It is a measure of the distinction between the roles of the chairman and CEO and we assign a dummy value of 1 if chairman and chief executive officer are separated and 0 if they are merged (Mohammad et al., 2013) . 4) Proportion of women directors: It is defined as the strength of the women directors to total number of board members (Abdullah et al., 2016) . 5) Annual remuneration per board member: It is defined as the ratio of total remuneration of the board to the total number of board members (Tremblay et al., 2003) . 6) Annual remuneration per executive director: It is the ratio of the total remuneration of executive directors to the total number of executive board members (Basu et al., 2007) . 7) Annual remuneration per non-executive director: It is the ratio of the total remuneration of non-executive directors to the total number of non-executive board members (Murphy, 2013) . 8) Number of board meetings: It is taken as the total number of board meetings in a year (Mohammad et al., 2013) . 9) Average no of meetings attended by directors: It is defined as the ratio of the sum total of meetings attended by directors to the total number of board members (Chou et al., 2013) . 10) Average number of boards served: It represents the multiple directorship aspect of the board of directors and is defined as the ratio of the number of boards each director serves on to the strength of the board (Barros et al., 2013) .
Control Variables
Firm performance is impacted by age, Anderson and Eshima (2013) and size of the firm. Bank age is defined as the years since the inception date of the bank. Bank size is defined as the logarithm of the total assets (Qian and Yeung, 2015) . Therefore, the control variables for the paper are bank age and bank size.
Method
Several approaches are available for panel data analysis. These include ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model (FEM), and random effects model methodologies (Greene, 2005) . The study used OLS methodology advocated by Wintoki et al. (2012) . The ordinary least squares method was used to empirically examine the causal/functional relationship among the variables (Bhaumik, 2015) . Multiple regression methodology was adopted after satisfying the five assumptions (i.e. normality, homoscedasticity, linearity, non-autocorrelation and no multicollinearity assumptions). The paper employed panel data methodology as followed by Matthews et al. (2007) .
Panel data has" both cross sectional and time series elements", and" is more informative allowing us to construct, and test more complicated behavioural models than pure cross section, or time series models" (Baltagi, 2005) . To investigate the issue of panel cointegration it is important to examine the existence of panel unit roots in the pooled data set for the banks. As per the results of the Levin Lin Chu test ( panel unit root test :refer Appendix 4) it is to be noted that all the dependent ,independent and control variables are observed to be stationary .Hence we conduct a static panel data testing of fixed effects, as well as static panel data of random effects."The models that were estimated using panel data were so specified that the heterogeneity among cross sectional units was taken care of " (Baltagi et al., 2003) . The Hausman test helped us to choose between fixed effects panel data model, and random effects panel data model (Bhaumik, 2015) .
Model
The study has employed the following model for the empirical examination.
QRatioit=α+β1ANBSit+β2ANMAit+β3CDSit+β4NBMEit+β5NBMit+β6PNEDit+β7PWDit+
γ1BANK_AGEit +
γ2L_BANK_ASSETSit+ εit
Where;
Tobin"s Q refers to Q ratio ANBS refers to the average no of boards each director serves on ANMA refers to the average number of meetings attended by each director CDS refers to the separation of the roles of the chairman and CEO for the banks NBME refers to the number of meetings of the bank"s board in a year NBM refers to the strength of the board PNED refers to the proportion of non-executive directors on the bank"s board PWD refers to the proportion of women directors on the respective board.
The control variable BANK_AGE refers to age of the particular bank and L_BANK_ASSETS refers to logarithm of bank assets.
Three independent variables namely, annual remuneration per executive board member, annual remuneration per board member and annual remuneration per non-executive board member were excluded from the study to avoid the problem of multicollinearity (refer Appendix 3). Hence, this paper has employed seven board characteristics as the proxy for corporate governance. Where ANBS refers to the average no of boards each director serves on ANMA refers to the average number of meetings attended by each director CDS refers to the separation of the roles of the chairman and CEO for the banks NBME refers to the number of meetings of the bank"s board in a year NBM refers to the strength of the board PNED refers to the proportion of non-executive directors on the bank"s board PWD refers to the proportion of women directors on the respective board ARPBM refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of the board to the total number of board members ARPED refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of executive directors to the total number of executive board members ARPNED refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of non-executive directors to the total number of nonexecutive board members
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION a) Descriptive Statistics
From Table 2 , we can observe that, the mean Q ratio for the sample banks is 1.43 times, whereas, the standard deviation of Q ratio is 1.26 times. The sample banks have a mean age of 73.94 years with a standard deviation of 35.26 years. The log of assets for sample banks has an average of 6.19, and a standard deviation of 0.46. The table 1.2 depicts the distribution of logarithm of bank assets and bank age and both these control variables are negatively skewed. On the other hand, the distribution of Q Ratio is positively skewed. Q Ratio has quite high kurtosis value, thereby representing a departure from normality. The log of bank assets, and bank age on the other hand have kurtosis values less than three, representing lighter tails. Tobin"s Q refers to Q ratio.
b) Correlation Analysis
To check for the possibility of spurious regression coefficients arising from multicollinearity in the regressors , pairwise correlation analysis was done. The Pearson pairwise correlations was estimated for the independent, dependent, and control variables. Where ANBS refers to the average no of boards each director serves on ANMA refers to the average number of meetings attended by each director CDS refers to the separation of the roles of the chairman and CEO for the banks NBME refers to the number of meetings of the bank"s board in a year NBM refers to the strength of the board PNED refers to the proportion of non-executive directors on the bank"s board PWD refers to the proportion of women directors on the respective board.
ARPBM refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of the board to the total number of board members ARPED refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of executive directors to the total number of executive board members ARPNED refers to the ratio of the total remuneration of non-executive directors to the total number of nonexecutive board members Q ratio refers to Tobin"s Q BANK_AGE refers to age of the particular bank L_BANK_ASSETS refers to logarithm of bank assets.
c) Regression Analysis

Robust Regression
The values obtained for heteroscedasticity for the OLS estimator for the model were high (refer Appendix 2).
Therefore, we employ robust regression, as an alternative to ordinary least squares regression. As the errors were found to be heteroskedastic, robust regression handled the violation of OLS assumptions, and did not get influenced by the violations.
We can observe from table 4 that only two out of seven board characteristics variables viz. CEO Duality Score and average number of boards served influence the market performance of Indian banks measured by Tobin"s Q.
The coefficient for average number of boards served was 0.1636 ,indicating that the Q Ratio increases by 0.17 times for every unit increase in the average number of boards served by the board directors of the sample banks which is in support of the findings of Carpenter and Westphal (2001) . The coefficient for the CEO Duality Score was 0.21 thus indicating that the Q ratio increases by 0.21 times for every unit increase in the CEO Duality scores.
This supports the conclusion of Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) . The remaining five board characteristics were found to be insignificant in determining the market performance of banks. Both the control variables had a negative and significant association with the market performance of the banks. The overall model was significant at 1 % level of significance. Where Q ratio refers to Tobin"s Q ANBS refers to the average no of boards each director serves on ANMA refers to the average number of meetings attended by each director CDS refers to the separation of the roles of the chairman and CEO for the banks NBME refers to the number of meetings of the bank"s board in a year NBM refers to the strength of the board PNED refers to the proportion of non-executive directors on the bank"s board PWD refers to the proportion of women directors on the respective board.
The control variable BANK_AGE refers to age of the particular bank and L_BANK_ASSETS refers to logarithm of bank assets
Fixed Effects Panel Data Regression
We conducted the Hausman test to examine if the model could be tested with the random effects method or fixed effects method. Based on the Hausman test result (refer Table 5 ), we have followed the fixed effects method for estimation of Q ratio of sample banks (see Table 5 ).
We can observe from table 6 that only three out of seven board characteristics variables viz. CEO Duality Score, average number of boards served and number of board meetings influence the market performance of Indian banks measured by Tobin"s Q.
The coefficient for average number of boards served is 0.184 therefore indicating that the Q Ratio increased by 0.18 times for every unit increase in the average number of boards served by the sample banks. This is in line with the findings of Carpenter and Westphal (2001) . The coefficient for the CEO Duality Score is 0.376 thus indicating that the Q ratio increases by 0.38 times for every unit increase in the CEO Duality scores. This supports the findings of Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) . The coefficient for number of meetings is 0.0686, thus indicating that the Q ratio of banks increases by 0.07 times for every unit increase in the number of board meetings held. The remaining four board characteristics were found to be insignificant in determining the market performance of banks. Both the control variables had a negative and significant association with the market performance of the banks. The r square value was 0. 235. Further the overall model was significant at 1 % level of significance. Where ARPNED is the average of remuneration per non-executive director.
ARPED is the average of remuneration per executive director.
ARPBM is the average remuneration per board member.
ANBS is the average number of boards served per board member.
ANMA is the average number of meetings attended per board member CDS is the CEO Duality Score NBME is the number of board meetings conducted.
NBM is the number of board members PNED is the proportion of non-executive directors PWD is the proportion of women directors
Bank_Age is the age of the bank measured since the date of inception L_Bank_Assets is logarithm of the total assets of the bank Q_Ratio is the ratio of (Market value of the bank/Replacement value of the bank)
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The paper has measured corporate governance of Indian banks using data reported by them in their annual reports for ten board characteristics. This paper concludes that three out of ten board characteristics considered by the study namely, the average number of boards served , CEO duality and the number of board meetings conducted ,positively affect the market performance of Indian banks(measured through Q ratio)This reflects that busier boards, greater separation of chairman and CEO roles and higher frequency of board meetings contribute positively to maximization of market value(measured through Q ratio of the sample banks).
The contribution of the study to the domain of corporate governance and bank performance are many folds .Firstly, this study measures corporate governance through perusal of annual reports of the sample banks and considers ten characteristics of the board as proxies for corporate governance. Researchers hereafter may use these variables as proxy for corporate governance in their research works. Secondly, Indian banks can improve their market performance by inducting the board members with experience and expertise. Thirdly, Indian banks can improve their Q ratio by separating the role of their chairman and CEO. Finally, market performance of Indian banks can be increased by conducting board meetings at a higher frequency.
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Test for multicollinearity 
